Abstract. Given a block cipher of length L Cook's elastic cipher allows to encrypt messages of variable length from L to 2L. Given some conditions on the key schedule, Cook's elastic cipher is secure against any key recovery attack if the underlying block cipher is, and it achieves complete diffusion in at most q + 1 rounds if the underlying block cipher achieves it in q rounds. We extend Cook's construction inductively, obtaining an elastic cipher for any message length greater than L with the same properties of security as Cook's elastic cipher.
Introduction
We present here an extension of Cook's elastic block cipher. Her extension E 1 allows to construct an elastic cipher of length from L to 2L, where L was the message length of the fixed input length block cipher E 0 . She related the security against key recovery attack of the elastic to that of the initial block cipher round function, using it as a black box. We start from E 1 and apply the elastic extension to E 1 itself, obtaining E 2 and we relate its security against key recovery attacks to that of E 1 , and we repeat the process to build iteratively an elastic extension E n of E 0 which takes inputs of length 2 n−1 L up to 2 n L. Section 2 gives a brief description of Cook's idea reminding which are the key schedule requirements. Section 3 describes our extension, showing the algorithm to encrypt a plaintext of length 2 n−1 L + y, with 0 ≤ y ≤ 2 n−1 L. Section 4 is devoted to the security of E n , first analyzing how the extension influences the diffusion properties of the round function of E 0 , and second giving a proof of how the security against key recovery attack of E n is reduced to that of E 0 . This is made following and extending Cook's proof for E 1 .
Cook's Elastic Cipher

Preliminaries
Let n ∈ N, n ≥ 1. Let {0.1}
≥n denote the set of all binary strings with length at least n. The function l(M ) denotes the length of the string M . A message/plaintext space M is a nonempty subset of {0, 1}
≥n for which M ∈ M implies that M ′ ∈ M for all M ′ of the same length of M . A ciphertext space (or range) C is a nonempty subset of {0, 1}
≥n . From now on, C = M. A key space K is a nonempty set together with a probability measure on that set. A pseudorandom permutation (PRP) with key space K, message space M and range C is a set of permutations F = {F K | K ∈ K} where each F K : M → C. We usually write F : K × M → C. We assume that l(F K (M )) depends only on l(M ). A variable input length (VIL) cipher is a PRP F : K × M → M. A block-cipher round (or simply a round ) is a key-dependent permutation of the message/ciphertext space, precisely R : K × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . As usual we can consider {0, 1} n to denote the vector space (F 2 ) n . The number n is called the block length. We consider rounds made of a round function (which is an invertible Boolean function indicated with the letter C, and that may be applied to just some of the round input bits, as in DES), followed by an affine map and a sum with the round key. A block-cipher (BC) is a cipher F : K × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n obtained from the composition of r rounds, whose keys are generated from the cipher key k ∈ K by a key schedule. We write
Description of the Elastic Cipher
Call E 0 a block cipher with input length L, composed by r 0 rounds, where the ith round is indicated by R 0i , with i = 0..r 0 − 1. Definition 1. The cycle of a block cipher is a Boolean function made of the least, over any key, number (called length) of consecutive rounds such that each bit of the cycle output is a function of at least two input bits.
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We consider only ciphers that can be divided in cycles of the same length. Suppose E 0 has c 0 cycles, and let C 0j (.) be E 0 jth cycle function (j = 1..r 0 /x where x is the number of rounds per cycle). Consider only block ciphers whose round function has a whitening as last operation (this is very common in real cipher such as AES, Serpent DES, ...). E 0 has r 0 = c 0 · x rounds. We can define now E 1 , the elastic extension of E 0 Definition 2. 4 An elastic cipher E 1 of E 0 is a VIL cipher with message space {0, 1}
L+y with 0 ≤ y ≤ L, constructed from E 0 as follows:
-the number of rounds of E 1 is r 1 = c 0 + ⌈c 0 · y/L⌉ -E 1 's ith round R 1i has one E 0 's cycle as round function, whose input are the leftmost L bits and whose last sum with the key is expanded to the rightmost y bit string T that is not input into the E 0 cycle; the round function C 0j is followed by a swap and an exor: 1. call R the rightmost y bit string which is the bit-wise sum of T with y key bits.
2. choose a y bit string S from the output of the cycle and let its bits be the rightmost ones of R 1i output; 3. replace S with S ⊕ T -add an initial and final whitening -add an initial and final key-dependent permutation (as in [3, page 24]) between the initial and final whitening and the rounds.
Key Schedule Requirements for the Elastic Cipher
We give three requirements for the key schedule taken from [2, page 153] which can be satisfied if we use a pseudorandom generator (e.g. RC4 as in [4, page 24]):
1. the key schedule should be a stand-alone algorithm that is usable to any BC; 2. the expanded-key bits should be (or as close to) pseudorandom (as practical); 3. the expanded-key rate for elastic block cipher should be a small multiple of the key expansion rate of a standard BC.
Extension of the Elastic Cipher
Our proposal
Our proposal is to consider an elastic cipher E 1 working with fixed length messages (as it was a block cipher), and apply iteratively the elastic extension to it. We can define a cycle of an elastic cipher exactly as a cycle for a block cipher:
Definition 3. The cycle C 1i of an elastic cipher E 1 , with i = 0..r 1 /2 − 1, is a Boolean function made of the least, over any key, number of consecutive E 1 's rounds such that each bit of C 1i output is a function of at least two input bits.
Now we are ready to construct E 2 , E 3 , ..., E n , simply by iterating the previous process. The first round function of E 2 looks like Fig.1 , whose notation is explained in the following lines:
-the subscripts A, B, Y indicate respectively the L leftmost, the L second leftmost and the Y rightmost bits of the input P or of the key K.
is the cycle function of E k used as round function in round i of E k+1 .
-K X is a portion of bits of the key K, where X = [i..j] indicates a set of indexes. In Fig.1 we have:
A is the portion A of the input of the i + 1th round, or equivalently the output of the ith round. Similarly for Some Terminology. Call E n an elastic cipher of E 0 of level n. n is also called the level of the extension E n . E n is able to encipher blocks from length 2 n−1 L to 2 n L. We'll call R n and C n respectively the round and the cycle functions of E n . r n (and c n ) indicates respectively the number of round (cycles) in E n . r m /E n with n > m, indicates the number of rounds of E m used in E n . Remark 1. The level increases by 1 when the message length doubles, and in general the level increases by k when the length passes from 2 n L to 2 n+k L, which means the level increases logarithmically in respect to the message length.
Remark 2.
Once n is fixed, only E n takes variable inputs and has initial and final key-dependent permutations, all other E i , with i < n, take as input messages of fixed length 2 i L and do not have initial and final key-dependent permutation.
Elastic Cipher Extension of Level n
Here we give explicitly the steps to encipher a message of any length greater than L using an extended elastic cipher of a certain level, obtained from a FIL block cipher E 0 that works on messages of length L. This algorithms are the definition of E n . Furthermore we give some theorems and their proofs to understand the formulas used. We divide the enciphering algorithm in two parts: initialization of E n and encryption. For brevity, in this article, we will omit the algorithm for decryption and CycleF unction −1 .
Initialization of E n . The following algorithm initializes the elastic cipher E n , given a message P of given length.
INPUT: P . OUTPUT: the level n, the exponent y, the number of rounds rn, l(K), the key length, K a random vector of length l(K).
1. Determine the level n of the elastic extension as the least power of 2 such that 2
is the length function. 3. Determine rn = c0 + ⌈c0
Determine the key K:
-Determine the key length: // (see Th.2)
string with random bits // e.g. using a pseudorandom generator
Encryption Function E n . Steps to encrypt a message P with E n initialized.
INPUT: P, K, y, n, rn. OUTPUT: P encrypted.
1. k = 0 // k is a pointer to the first bit not used of the key.
..,j+y−1] //T is a temporary value for the swap steps (e) P [j,...,j+y
Cycle of E m , used in the encryption function.
INPUT: the bit string M , the level m of the cycle function (M has length 2 m L). OUTPUT: the 2 m L bit string M processed by CycleF unction.
In particular 7 if m = 0:
The following theorem, beside giving an explicit formula for the key bits needed for encryption shows that Cook's third requirement for the key schedule is satisfied because the key expansion rate grows polynomially with the input length. Let's call l KC (n) the function that gives the number of bits needed for the key of the cycle of level n, or simply the key length of cycle C n .
Theorem 2 (Key Length). If we consider E n with initial and final whitening and key-dependent permutation, the number of bits needed as key bits is:
4 Security of the Elastic Cipher Extension
Diffusion
In her paper, [3, page 8], Cook shows that if complete diffusion occurs after q cycles in E 0 (the fixed length block cipher), then it occurs after at most q + 1 rounds in E 1 (the elastic version of E 0 ). We extend this proof for E n .
Theorem 3 (Complete Diffusion).
If complete diffusion occurs after q cycles in E n−1 (an elastic cipher working with length message 2 n−1 L), then it occurs after at most q + 1 rounds in E n (the elastic version of E n−1 ).
Proof. According to [3, page 6 ], complete diffusion is achieved in q rounds if every single bit input to a l-bit block cipher influences the value in all l bits after q rounds, where we say that a q rounds input bit b i influences a q rounds output bit b j if changing b i , while holding all other l − 1 input bits constant, causes b j to change with probability > 0, when the probability is taken over all possible values of other input bits and the key bits are held constant. First notice that whitening does not impact diffusion, so, for the purposes of our proof, we can view the elastic expansion without them. We can see that each of the first 2 n−1 input bits b j that influences a bit in position j of the output of C n−1 will influence one (or more) bit in position j of the output of R n , and if b i influences a bit exored after the cycle, then b i will also influence a output bit of R n in position between 2 n−1 L and 2 n−1 L + y − 1. So, if we have complete diffusion in E n−1 after q rounds, then, in E n , the first 2 n−1 L input bits will keep influencing all 2 n L + y output bits after q rounds. In E n , the rightmost y bits of the input do not influence the first cycle, but because of the swap step they influence the second cycle and since then they will influence all the cycles and will reach complete diffusion after q + 1 cycles. ⊓ ⊔ On Diffusion Probabilities and Ideal Diffusion. We now illustrate how the elastic expansion impacts on the probabilities that a bit of the output of a round function changes, given that one input bit changed while keeping all other input bits fixed, and with constant key bits. Consider a black box f (.) that works with a L bit string (which represents our cycle function). We call the input bit string P in and the output bit string P out , and we denote a single input bit (in position i) P Denote the number of times we had a change in the bit P out j with n c = n 01 +n 10 , and denote the number of times the value in jth position remained equal with n e = 2 L−1 − n c = n 00 + n 11 . At the end of the experiment, changing the bit in position i of the input produces a change in the bit in position j of the output with probability p c = nc 2 L−1 and does not produce a change with probability p e = ne 2 L−1 . The ideal situation for a cycle function is when n 00 = n 11 = n 01 = n 10 = 2 L−1 4 . Now consider a second experiment B, where we have the same black box f (.) as in experiment A, and where we add some new steps, which are the elastic steps that influence diffusion, namely the exor and swap steps. as in Fig.2 (0 ≤ k < y). Now the input bit string has L + y bits. We want to repeat the experiment with this new scheme to see how the elastic expansion acts on the probability of a change in one single output bit given a variation in one single input bit. First consider the output of f (.). We observe that repeating the experiment 2 L+y−1 times the output string right after the black box 8 will give n B rs = n A rs ·2 y , where n X rs denotes the number of times the jth output bit passed from r to s in the experiment X, with r, s ∈ {0, 1}. This is because we are actually repeating the experiment A 2 y times, with the leftmost y bits not influencing the function f (.). This gives that p . Now consider the output of the entire experiments. Because last y bits do not influence the black box function, they do not influence the part of the final output of the experiment B that does not come from the output of the last exor. So we are interested in analyzing the bits of the output in those position j influenced by the exor step. Through the entire experiment B, the bit f (P in i ) will be exored half of the times with 0 and half of the times with 1 (which come from the rightmost y bits). This means that if we counted, for instance, n A 00 · 2 y times for the jth output bit of f (.) not changing from 0, after the exor we will count
times for the jth output bit of the exor not changing from 0. With the same reasoning we obtain the following scheme:
8 we will refer to it as f (P in i ), and f (P in i )j will indicate its jth bit
The probability a bit of the output (in position j) changed given a change of one bit in the input (in position i) is:
2 )2 y + (
2 )2
And similarly q B c = 1/2. This means that P out j (when j is a position included between the positions coming from the exor output) changes with probability p B = 50%, given a variation of P in i . Reasoning as in Theor. 3, and with the last results, we can conclude that:
Theorem 4 (Ideal Diffusion). If ideal diffusion occurs after q cycles in E n−1 (an elastic cipher working with length message 2 n−1 L), then it occurs after at most q + 1 rounds in E n (the elastic version of E n−1 ). Note 1. The fact that after the exor each bit changes with probability 50% is a good result but it may be a weakness. Because an adversary could distinguish a block cipher from the elastic cipher if the elastic round function R 0 (.) does not achieve ideal diffusion after a certain number of rounds; it would be sufficient to implement the experiment we described for a reasonable amount of input messages and see if there is an output bit sequence that change with probability 1/2, while all other output bit change with probability significantly different from 1/2.
Proof of Security Against Key Recovery
We now establish that E n is secure against any key recovery attack 9 if so is E 0 .
Theorem 5 (Security Against Key Recovery). Given an elastic cipher, E n−1 of level n − 1 (without initial and final whitening and key-dependent permutation), working on 2 n−1 L-bit blocks and its elastic version, E n , that works on (2 n−1 L + y)-bit blocks, where 0 ≤ y ≤ 2 n−1 L, if there exists an attack, A n , on E n that allows the round keys to be determined for r consecutive rounds of E n using t An operation, then there exists an attack A n−1 on E n−1 with r cycles that finds the expanded key for E n−1 and that uses t An−1 < O(sr 2 + rt An ), assuming there are no message-dependent expanded key, meaning any expanded-key bits utilized in E n−1 depend only on the key and do not vary across plaintext or ciphertext inputs. In particular, if A n is polynomial then A n−1 is polynomial.
Proof. We show how the attack A n can be converted to an attack to E n−1 in polynomial time. Suppose we want to find a set of cycles keys K j = {K j Cn−1,1 , ..., K j Cn−1,r } that enciphered the set of s messages P 0 = {P 00 , ..., P 0(s−1) } in the ciphertexts P r = {P r0 , ..., P r(s−1) } using the elastic cipher E n−1 working with blocks of length 2 n−1 L. First of all notice that we put an exponent j to K, because there may be more than one set of cycle keys enciphering the same couples (P 0i , P ri ) for i = 0..s − 1. One set is sufficient for us. To find the set of keys K j build an attack as follows. Consider the sets: P ′ 0 = {P 00 0...0, ..., P 0(s−1) 0...0} and P ′ r = {P r0 v 01 ...v 0y , ..., P r(s−1) v (s−1)1 ...v (s−1)y }, where P 00 0...0 is the bit string P 0i followed by y zeros (we could choose any fixed string of y bits instead of all zeros), and P ri v i1 ...v iy is the bit string P ri followed by any string of y bits. The elements of the sets P ′ 0 and P ′ r fit as input and output for a r-rounds reduced elastic extension E n of E n−1 . So we can apply the attack A n to the set of pairs (P 0i 0...0, P ri v i1 ...v iy ) and obtain a set K ′ of t sets K i ′ (i = 1..t) of r round keys for E n in polynomial time in L and r. View this in Fig.3 .
vi1...viy Pir From K ′ we choose one of the possible set of round keys, namely K
We can find K 
where C n−1,1 (K j Cn−1,1 , .) is the cycle function obtained using the cycle key K j Cn−1,1 . Notice that we can sum the last y key bits of the whitening step because the message to which they are exored is known all zeros in our case ; this is the reason why we can not do the same thing with the next cycle key but we have to restart a new attack as we are going to explain. Now we repeat the process mounting the attack to a r − 1 round reduced extension E n of E n−1 , using the couples (P 1i 0...0, P ri v i1 ...v iy ) and we find one by one the cycle keys K j Cn−1,1 , with i = 2..r. The attack is done applying A n r times with s pairs of (plaintext, ciphertext) and running one cycle of E n−1 for each pair, for a total of sr application of C n−1 . If A n requires to know the output of each round of the reduced round version of E n , then
rounds of E n have to be computed. If we call t An the time to run the attack, then the total number of operation required for the reduction is O(sr 2 + rt An ). In her theorem, Cook also considers the time to check that an expanded key found by A n adheres to the key schedule of E 0 . For us it is not necessary since the key schedule of E n−1 is a pseudorandom generator and as such, any bit sequence must fit.
⊓ ⊔
